Abstract. The ElGamal encryption scheme is described in the setting of any finite cyclic group G. Among the groups of most interest in cryptography are the multiplicative group Z of the ring of integers modulo a prime p, and the multiplicative groups . Their major finding is that the quotient ring need not be a field. In this paper, we consider another extension employing the group of units of , where is a product of irreducible polynomials whose degrees are pairwise relatively prime. The arithmetic needed in this new setting is described. Examples, algorithms and proofs are given. Advantages of the new method are pointed out and comparisons with the classical case of are made.
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Introduction
The ElGamal encryption scheme is typically described in the setting of the multiplicative group , the group of units of the ring of integers modulo a prime p, but it can be easily generalized to work in any finite cyclic group G. The security of the generalized ElGamal encryption scheme is based on the intractability of the discrete logarithm problem in the group G. The group G should be carefully chosen so that the group operations in * p Z G would be relatively easy to apply for efficiency. In addition, the discrete logarithm problem in G should be computationally infeasible for the security of the protocol that uses the ElGamal public-key cryptosystem.
The groups of most interest in cryptography are the multiplicative groups of the finite field F Cross [1] gave a classification of all Gaussian integers β such that the group of units of the quotient ring Z[i]/<β> is cyclic. So, one may consider ElGamal public-key cryptosystem using the cyclic group of units of Z[i]/<β>, where β = 1+i, (1+i)², (1+i)³, p, (1+i)p, πⁿ, (1+i) πⁿ, p is a prime integer of the form 4k+3, and π is a Gaussian prime with |π| 2 is a prime integer of the form 4k+1. Recently, El-Kassar et al. [3] described the computational procedures using arithmetic modulo Gaussian integers required for the extension of ElGamal encryption scheme to the domain of Gaussian integers.
In [8] 
is a product of irreducible polynomials whose degrees are pairwise relatively prime.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the classical ElGamal scheme. In section 3, we summarize the extension, given in [3] , of ElGamal cryptosystem to the domain of Gaussian integers. Section 4 presents the classification, obtained in [4] [6] and [7] .
* p
Z
Suppose that entity B wants to send a message m to entity A. Entity B proceeds as follows: B gets the public key generated by A, then computes the ciphered message c = EA(m) and sends it to A for decryption. To decipher it, A computes DA(c) = m.
Entity A generates the public-key by first generating a large random prime p and a generator θ of . Then A chooses randomly an integer a, 1 ≤ a ≤ p−2, and computes θ see [1] . This choice will be excluded since the calculations in this case are identical to those of the classical one. Hence, β is chosen to be a large prime integer p of the form 4k+3 so that
, where the number of elements in Gβ is p² and in is φ(β) = p²−1.
Hence, the cyclic group used in the extended ElGamal cryptosystem has an order larger than the square of that used in the classical ElGamal cryptosystem with no additional efforts required for finding the prime p.
Now, a generator θ of is selected and note that there are φ(p²−1) generators in
. Then a random positive integer a is chosen so that the public-key is (p, θ, θ
Since a is a power of θ, then a must be less than the order of the group power which is p²−1. This power of a is the private key.
To encrypt a message m, we first represent it as an element m in Gβ. Then, a random positive integer k is selected to be used as a power so that k is less than p²−1. The encrypted message is c = (γ, δ) where γ ≡ θ k (mod β) and δ ≡ m.(θ a ) k (mod β). Note that the values of γ and δ must be elements of Gβ and hence must be reduced modulo β. The message c is decrypted using the private key a to compute γ − a .δ modulo β. with degree less than that of f(x). For each irreducible polynomial h(x) of degree n over a finite field Fq, the factor ring Fq[x]/<h(x)> is a finite field of order qⁿ. Its group of units is isomorphic to the cyclic group Zqⁿ − 1. In the case where f(x) is not irreducible over Fq, the quotient ring Fq[x]/<f(x)> is not a field. However, f(x) can be selected so that the group of units of the quotient ring Fq[x]/<f(x)> is cyclic. This can be done by using the structure of the group of units of Fq[x]/<f(x)> given by Smith and Gallian [8] . Before we summarize their results we recall the following well-known results. For a finite commutative ring R with identity, we know from the fundamental theorem of finite abelian groups that U(R) is isomorphic to a direct product of cyclic groups. Also, if R is a direct sum of rings then its group of units is isomorphic to the direct product of the corresponding group of units of each of the summands.
Since and . In the case where f(x) is not irreducible over F
q, theorem 1 can be applied and the problem reduces to that of finding the structure of ( ) 
The following theorems simplify the problem further.
Theorem 2. Let Fq be a finite field and let h(x) be an irreducible polynomial in Fq [x] . If a is a root of h(x) and K = Fq(a), the extension of Fq by a, then i) f(x) = h1(x) is irreducible and ( )
ii) f(x) = h1(x) 2 , where h1(x) is linear, q = p and
is linear, and Proof. Since γ(x) ≡ α(x) a (mod x²), where α(x) is a generator of the multiplicative group U(Zp[x]/<x²>), it follows that γ(x) is in U(Zp[x]/<x²>) so that gcd(γ(x), x²) = 1. Therefore, using a version of Fermat's little theorem for polynomials over a finite field, we have that γ(x) p(p − 1) − 1 ≡ 1 (mod x²).
− ak (mod x²) and thus γ(x)
− ak .m(x).α(x) ak ≡ m(x) (mod x²). Since m(x) and s(x) belong to the same reduced residue system modulo x² and s(x) ≡ m(x) (mod x²), we have that m(x) = s(x). Hence, m(x) is recovered by reducing γ(x) − a .δ(x) modulo x². This is equivalent to say that gcd(f(x), hj(x)) = 1, for every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ r.
The extended ElGamal cryptosystem in this setting is given next through three algorithms. First, to generate the corresponding public and private keys, entity A should use the following algorithm: 
Proof. Since γ(x) ≡ α(x) a (mod h(x)), where α(x) is a generator of the multiplicative group U(Z2[x]/<h(x)>), it follows that γ(x) is in U(Z2[x]/<h(x)>) so that gcd(γ(x), h(x)) = 1. Therefore, using a version of Fermat's little theorem for polynomials over a finite field, we have that
− ak (mod h(x)) and mod h(x) ). Since m(x) and s(x) are in the same complete residue system modulo h(x) and s(x) ≡ m(x) (mod h(x)), we have that m(x) = s(x). Hence, m(x) is recovered by reducing 
Efficiency and Security of ElGamal Cryptosystem in the Domain of Polynomials over a Finite Field
The ElGamal encryption scheme can described in any finite cyclic group G. The security of the ElGamal encryption scheme is based on the intractability of the discrete logarithm problem in G. The group G should be carefully selected for efficiency and security so that the operation in G can be easily applied and the discrete logarithm problem in G should be computationally infeasible. Among groups meeting these criteria that have received the most attention are the multiplicative group of Zp and the multiplicative group of the finite field of characteristic two . We proposed three modifications of ElGamal encryption employing the group of units of: These modifications generalize the two classical cases of and .
In the first two cases, the cyclic groups used have orders larger than the square of that used in . Thus, the message space is enlarged with no additional efforts required for finding the prime p. Moreover, the computational procedures in these groups are not much different from those used in the classical case. Hence, we propose to work in the setting of Z
/<x 2 > whenever the prime p generated is of the form 4k+1. If the prime p generated is of the form 4k+3, then we propose to work either in relatively prime. In the following, we list some remarks comparing the two methods.
• Cryptographic applications in rings of characteristic two, such as Z2[x]/<h(x)>, are of particular interest. The arithmetic in these rings can be efficiently performed both in software and in hardware.
• • In both cases irreducible polynomials must be found, one in the classical case and two or more in the new settings. This may suggest that the classical case is more efficient. However, finding irreducible polynomials of small degree can be obtained much more quickly than finding one irreducible polynomial of large degree.
• Efficient implementation of the arithmetic in Z2[x]/<h(x)> can usually be achieved if the irreducible polynomial chosen has few non-zero terms. In particular, efficient algorithms for finding Irreducible trinomials exist, see [7] .
• Given an irreducible polynomial hj(x) of degree dj over Zp, there are more efficient methods for generating new irreducible polynomials of the same degree from hj(x). Hence, once G2 has been generated, it is easier to generate another with the same order. In particular, if x d + x k + 1 is irreducible over Z2 then so is is prime, then x is a generator for the factor U(Z2[x]/<hj(x)>). A table listing either a primitive trinomial or a primitive pentanomial of degree d over Z2 is given in [7] , where d is an exponent of one of the first 27
Mersenne primes (primes of the form 2 d −1).
• 
Z
is a field and must work in this setting.
• The new proposed scheme has the property that breaking it requires both factoring the modulus h(x) and solving the discrete logarithm problem. If a cryptanalyst somehow learns the factors of h(x), then in order to recover plaintext from ciphertext it is still left with the task of solving the discrete logarithm problem modulo the factors of h(x).
Conclusion
Using a characterization of quotient rings of polynomials over finite fields with a cyclic group of units, the ElGamal encryption scheme was extended relatively prime, was considered. In this case one need to find irreducible polynomials over Z2 and no large prime is generated. A list some of advantages of the new method over the classical case in working in a finite field of characteristic two along with and remarks on the efficiency were given. These remarks and comparative studies of the methods will be investigated in future work.
